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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes potential methods intended to influence trust within military 
units and their use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. AI systems are being 
developed to enhance the human decision-making process and when employed properly 
can greatly increase the rate at which actions are taken, a key requirement for 
generating combat power. Human and AI teams rely on the user’s trust for the AI 
system, and that trust is influenced by rational, affective, and normative trust factors. 
This thesis examines those trust factors and determines that only rational trust 
factors are directly connected to the trustworthiness of the AI and that the 
user’s trust can be influenced independently of the AI’s trustworthiness through 
affective and normative trust factors. Influencing the user’s trust of the AI through 
substitution of affective and normative trust factors in place of rational trust factors 
produces unjustified trust because this trust is not dependent on the trustworthiness of 
the AI. 
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The rapidly improving ability of computer systems to solve problems and 
to perform tasks that would otherwise require human intelligence is 
transforming many aspects of human life and every field of science. It will 
be incorporated into virtually all future technology. The entire innovation 
base supporting our economy and security will leverage AI. How this “field 
of fields” is used—for good and for ill—will reorganize the world. 
(National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021, p. 20) 
As great power rivals and the two leaders in AI development, the United States of 
America (USA) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are seeking to compete on and 
using AI. The competition on AI reflects a desire to be the global leader of AI research, 
development, and employment. This competition is most pronounced in the information 
and economic arenas, where the USA currently holds the pole position for AI development 
(National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, p. 20). This reality is not 
overlooked by the PRC, which is committed to a strategy of heavily resourced and highly 
emphasized endeavors to close that competitive gap in the coming decade (State Council, 
2017, pp. 5–7). The competition using AI will also occur in the information and economic 
arenas but will also include the military arena. Both country’s view the incorporation of AI 
into warfare as totally transformational and fundamentally necessary to its future (National 
Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021, p. 79) (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2020, p. 161). This perspective is because of the incredible value that AI offers 
to the competitor that can most effectively employ it first.  
AI is attractive to the military because of its high potential to increase the rate at 
which vast quantities of data can be processed at minute levels of detail into actionable 
information. This increased rate of action directly translates to a higher operational speed 
which is desirable because speed is one of the foundational aspects of combat power (U.S. 
Marine Corps, 2018, p. 2.19). Being faster than an adversary means having the initiative 
against them, a position where they must react and they cannot choose the time nor place 
of confrontation (U.S. Marine Corps, 2018, pp. 2.11-2.12). Considering that speed 
produces combat power, it should come as no surprise that AI, as a source of speed, is 
being heavily prioritized by militaries. For the foreseeable future, it is most likely that both 
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countries will seek to employ personnel and AI together in human-AI teams (HAT). The 
HAT benefits from the accuracy and rapidity of processing possessed by the AI paired with 
the creative, normative, and perceptive abilities of the human; properly teamed, each 
performs tasks best suited to it that results in better overall performance (National Security 
Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021, p. 80). Thus, the military which can deploy 
the best HAT will likely gain a significant combat advantage over the other. 
The potential combat power advantages gained by an adversary through the use of 
HAT requires development of countermeasures to mitigate that potential advantage. This 
potential adversary advantage can be overcome by developing faster friendly capabilities, 
degrading the adversary’s capabilities, or by choosing a strategy that makes the adversary’s 
advantage irrelevant (e.g., utilizing diplomacy, information, or economic power in such a 
way that the adversary will not choose to utilize its military power). This research will 
focus on investigating exploitation of vulnerabilities to disrupt the adversary’s HAT. 
Critical to the functioning of the HAT is the need for the AI to be trustworthy, 
which is the basis for the user’s trust of the AI. Without trust, the user will likely either 
monitor the outputs of the AI so closely that the speed advantage of the HAT is lost or will 
stop using the AI altogether (J. Lee & See, 2004, p. 50). Thus, friendly efforts to decrease 
the mission performance of the adversary HAT should focus on undermining trust.  
This research will define a method for decreasing an adversary’s HAT performance 
by determining how to use heuristics to influence the user’s trust level in the AI. Heuristics 
are the focus of Chapter II, which introduces the cognitive processes of perception and 
intuitive decision making. It will be shown that an intuitive decision relies upon both the 
available data in the environment and the subconscious substitution of a related judgement 
in order to make that decision. Making decisions based upon a substituted judgement, the 
decisionmaker is exposed to the potential for errors. Exploring AI systems is the focus of 
Chapter III, which describes its fundamental subcomponents and the potential for an AI to 
be competent or compromised. These two states represent the high potential of AIs 
described in the opening paragraphs and the alternate potential for AIs to be faulty in design 
or vulnerable to deliberate attack. Chapter IV combines these topics and outlines that user’s 
trust can vary independently of the AI’s competency, and that the variance is subject to 
3 
influence using substituted trust factors. Chapter IV describes methods to influence a user’s 
trust within a HAT using heuristics will be defined. The conclusion provides study 
limitations and areas for future research identified while conducting this research. 
  
4 
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II. SCHEMA AND INTUITIVE DECISION MAKING AS 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a foundation for the cognitive processes and concepts that 
will be applied in Chapter IV. A discussion of these concepts helps to scope the research, 
focusing specifically on intuitive judgements as described by heuristics. These are 
intertwined with other cognitive processes and concepts that are discussed to provide the 
foundation for understanding their role in our judgments about AI, which will be covered 
in Chapter IV. The concepts discussed are not meant to be an exhaustive exploration in this 
space but rather are constrained to the scope of this thesis.  
B. INFORMATION AND SCHEMA 
Using the single term ‘information’ lacks the specificity necessary to properly 
develop an understanding of decision making. This is recognized in Chaim Zins’ 
“Conceptual Approaches for Defining Data, Information, and Knowledge”: 
The field of Information Science (IS) is constantly changing. Therefore, 
information scientists are required to regularly review—and if necessary—
redefine its fundamental building blocks. (Zins, 2007, p. 479) 
His article then collects definitions for the terms data, information, and knowledge 
from a panel of 57 scholars, representative of most fields within Information Science. The 
expansion from the singular term of ‘information’ to ‘data’, ‘information’, and 
‘knowledge’ permits a more nuanced approach that recognizes a progression from data to 
knowledge, as seen in these definitions provided by Donald Kraft: 
Data are atomic facts, basic elements of “truth,” without interpretation or 
greater context. It is related to things we sense. Information is a set of facts 
with processing capability added, such as context, relationships to other 
facts about the same or related objects, implying an increased usefulness. 
Information provides meaning to data. Knowledge is information with 
more context and understanding, perhaps with the addition of rules to 
extend definitions and allow inference. (Zins, 2007, p. 484) 
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For the purposes of this research, these definitions will be used. It is immediately 
obvious from this expanded definition that data comprises everything that is able to be 
sensed in the environment around the individual. Even with this nearly infinite source of 
data, humans are able to consume only limited quantities of data for transformation into 
information and knowledge. This uptake of data into the mind in meaningful ways is 
enabled by schemas. 
As it relates to cognition, a schema is “a memory structure capable of representing 
extremely complex constructs employing this information [knowledge] to influence 
encoding and retrieval of episodic memory, and guide elaborate, context-specific patterns 
of behavior” (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014, p. 113). Described another way, a schema is a 
memory framework that guides perception for anticipated data based upon knowledge and 
previous experiences that are associated with the present situation. Schemas are broadly 
characterized by Ghosh and Gilboa as necessarily having an associative network structure, 
a basis on many episodes, a lack of unit detail, and being adaptable across those many 
episodes (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014, p. 105). In addition to these necessary features, schemas 
consider chronological relationships and hierarchical organizations, assign the same 
schema-units to multiple schemas, and contain embedded-response options (Ghosh & 
Gilboa, 2014, p. 105). As a broad constructive example, consider ordering and eating at 
restaurant C. A ‘restaurant schema’ enables an individual to automatically apply memories 
from previous trips to restaurants A and B (many episodes) when visiting restaurant C for 
the first time because restaurants A, B, and C are categorically similar, even if they are not 
identical (associative network structure). The drink machine schema-unit developed in 
previous visits to restaurant A will guide recognition of the drink machine in restaurant C, 
even if the location in the restaurant or variety of drinks offered is different (lack of unit 
detail). The payment schema-unit changes across schema as the individual encounters 
different means of payment (adaptability). Payment is a schema-unit present in the 
‘restaurant schema’ that is also present in the ‘retail schema’ (same schema-units to 
multiple schemas). If the general process at restaurant A is order, eat, pay, leave table and 
the process at restaurant B is order, eat, leave table, pay the difference will likely prompt 
the individual at restaurant C to inquire about when it is appropriate to pay (chronological 
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relationship and embedded-response options). The ‘restaurant schema’ may itself be a sub-
schema available under a larger schema related to local vehicle travel (hierarchical 
organizations). Summarily, a schema is the cognitive learning aspect of gaining experience 
in a general situation.  
The volume of data available at any one time, that could potentially turn into 
knowledge is too vast for humans to attend to all of it. Schemas help to narrow down the 
data that is attended to and potentially acquired as information, all the way to what is turned 
into knowledge  through selecting, abstracting, interpreting, and integrating the incoming 
data (Alba & Hasher, 1983, p. 225). Because of this, schemas are intertwined with 
perception by guiding the senses through the available sensory inputs, or data based upon 
anticipation of specific data associated with that specific schema, which can be seen in 
Ulrich Neisser’s Perceptual Cycle, shown in Figure 1 (Neisser, 1976, p. 21).  
 
Figure 1. Perceptual Cycle. Source: Neisser (1976, p. 21). 
The development and change of a schema is shown by the ‘modifies’ arrow, an 
interaction that is also represented in Figure 2 (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014, p. 108).  
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Figure 2. Schema Development and Adaptation. Source: Ghosh and Gilboa 
(2014, p. 108). 
Because of the contextual nature of schemas, a single schema is activated for any 
one episode. If sensory data that is associated with a schema arrives at an individual, that 
schema will activate to guide the continuing collection of other pieces of data which are 
aligned with that schema. Plant and Staunton described this as bottom up activation that 
drives a top down schema response (Plant & Stanton, 2012, p. 302). The development and 
activation of a schema is not dependent on a single type of incoming data. In an experiment 
conducted by Johnson et al., participants who recalled sentences the best had received a 
contextually appropriate word before the sentence, compared to those who received a 
contextually inappropriate word or those who only heard “ready” (Johnson et al., 1974, 
pp. 358–359). For those who received the contextually inappropriate word, the lack of 
associating schema reduced the ability to recall the sentence. In another study, King et al. 
demonstrated that schema can be created and activated through motor sequence learning 
(King et al., 2019, p. 963). Differing groups of study participants were taught the same 
sequence of button pressing during their first session; during a second session, the different 
groups were either evaluated on performing the same sequence or a variety of other 
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sequences (King et al., 2019, pp. 965–967). The new sequences varied the order and 
transition between buttons, and those who were assigned the most incompatible session 
two sequences performed worse compared to those who were assigned new and compatible 
sequences (King et al., 2019, p. 974). This difference can be attributed to the schema 
developed during session one, because its associations aided those with familiar sequences 
but hindered those who received completely unfamiliar sequences. In both of these studies, 
it is apparent that when schemas are activated by data, the individual performs better than 
those for whom there is no activation or inaccurate activation. 
A specific type of schema activation is known as priming. Priming refers to the 
identification of perceptual objects in an associative manner that is disconnected from 
consciousness but is not necessarily unconscious (Tulving & Schacter, 1990, p. 302). This 
means that priming automatically happens as a part of the perceptual cycle and is not 
interrupted if the individual becomes aware of the stimulus. Priming extends through many 
psychological disciplines including social psychology where social priming of an 
individual can take place by presenting cultural identities as the perceptual object. (Molden, 
2014, pp. 4–5). What is critical to recognize is that an individual that is primed will more 
likely act in accordance with the prime than one who is not primed (Weingarten et al., 
2016, p. 490). In a study conducted with Asian Americans (n=116), the participants were 
separated into three groups (American self-priming, Asian self-priming, and control) and 
asked to complete ten sentences before writing in detail about two important memory 
events from their life (Wang, 2008, p. 745). The priming manipulation was achieved during 
the sentence completion, where the self-priming groups responded to five sentence prompts 
of “As an American (Asian), I am…” and five sentence prompts of “In general, Americans 
(Asians) are…”; the control group completed sentence prompts related to things in nature 
(Wang, 2008, p. 745). The effect of priming based on cultural identity appeared in the recall 
of memories, when those who were self-primed with an American identity were more 
likely to recall their own perspectives, views, and actions in the memory (I did…, I saw… 
I thought…) whereas those with an Asian identity were more likely to recall the 
interactions and behaviors of those involved in the memory (A told B…, C and D walked 
to…, E helped me…) (Wang, 2008, p. 747).  
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Priming is important to this thesis because of its compliance effect, where the 
stimulus guides the following perceptions. Chapter IV will utilize this idea when discussing 
the trust factors associated with AI. 
C. HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
The study of heuristics and their attendant biases grew out of an inability for the 
classical model of rational choice to explain consistently irrational decisions. In the rational 
model, 
the “rational actor” (i.e., the typical person) chooses what options to pursue 
by assessing the probability of each possible outcome, discerning the utility 
to be derived from each, and combining these two assessments. The option 
pursued is the one that offers the optimal combination of probability and 
utility. (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 1) 
To arrive at a truly rational choice, the decision maker would need a well filtered 
collection of data to produce information for their knowledge to then apply the formal rules 
of probability so that an accurate assessment can be made of the likelihood of outcomes. 
Filtering data and information is necessary because there is data and information that will 
produce knowledge that is irrelevant to a rational decision. For the model of rational choice 
to hold true, the decision maker would need to recognize this and discard that which does 
not apply.  
Common experience and research have shown that humans are not best represented 
by the rational actor. Herbert Simon is credited with the concept of bounded rationality, 
the idea that humans and other organisms are ‘satisficing’ instead of optimizing like in 
classical rationality (Simon, 1956, p. 136). Satisficing is the meeting of the first minimum 
threshold of acceptability in the available options, which permits the time limited decider 
to move onto the next task instead of considering every single option as would be necessary 
to rationally optimize a decision (Simon, 1956, p. 136). An indirect development of 
bounded rationality is Tversky and Kahneman’s research on intuitive decisions made in 
uncertain conditions. 
Tversky and Kahneman’s 1974 “Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases” provides evidence against the ‘rational actor’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 
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1124). In one of the originating experiments, Kahneman and Tversky presented study 
participants with a group of 100 people that were either engineers or lawyers; half of the 
participants were told that there were 70 engineers and 30 lawyers and the other half were 
told that there were 30 engineers and 70 lawyers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, p. 241). 
When participants were asked what the probability was of an individual belonging to a 
specific profession, the responses mirrored the given rate of occurrence for that profession 
unless there was an uninformative description of the individual (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1973, p. 242). An example of a description is as follows: 
Dick is a 30-year-old man. He is married with no children. A man of high 
ability and high motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field. 
He is well like by his colleagues. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, p. 242) 
This description contains no statistically relevant information but still altered the 
participants response from its correct value of 0.3 or 0.7 to a statistically incorrect value of 
0.5 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, p. 242). This consistent and predictable error, or bias, 
was termed “insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes” or neglect of base rates because 
it biased the value of the description of the individual over the given rates (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). Clearly, some form of irrationality is impacting the outcome of 
a rational evaluation and that indicates a fallibility of the rational actor.  
These results have been reinforced by numerous studies and the process has been 
standardized to that of substituting a heuristic attribute for the target attribute within the 
decision (Kahneman, 2003, p. 707). Although there are others, the most widely recognized 
heuristics are representativeness, availability, and affect (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 17). 
Representativeness is a substitution based on the similarity of a choice option to the 
available categories (Tversky & Kahneman, 2002, p. 22). Availability is a substitution 
based on the ease of arrival of mental occurrences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1127). 
Affect is a substitution base on the inherent goodness or badness of the choice option 
(Slovic et al., 2002, p. 397). It should be noted that each of these descriptions is the tip of 
separate academic-and-research icebergs, which are massive and full of nuanced 
similarities and differences. The importance of heuristics to this thesis comes in the 
substitution of a separate judgement that carries the potential for a flawed outcome. 
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In any decision, using the heuristic does not guarantee a flawed outcome, but it does 
expose the individual to the risk of violating a logical relationship by substituting a 
contextually related but illogical judgement. Cognitive biases describe the flawed 
outcomes which can result from the use of heuristics when making decisions. In the case 
of the previously described engineer and lawyer categorization study, base rate neglect is 
the identified bias because the study participants subconsciously ignored the given rate of 
occurrence and instead made evaluations based upon the apparent representativeness of the 
described individual for the two categories (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1125). Another 
cognitive bias is the omission bias, which results from an affective judgment of the 
potential consequences of an action as worse than the potential consequences of inaction, 
even if they consequences are objectively identical (Brown et al., 2010, p. 4182). From the 
perspective of the decision maker, neither use of these heuristics would seem to be 
unreasonable, but the results are contradictory to a logical consideration of the information 
and choices. Thus, careful consideration must be given as to how a decision is being made 
to avoid falling into a cognitive bias.  
Heuristic substitution in intuitive decision making is both aligned with and 
reinforced by dual process theory. Dual process theory is a refinement of bounded 
rationality that separates intuitive thinking and decision-making from analytical thinking 
and decision-making and seeks to define their relationship to the other (Sloman, 2002, p. 
379). (Sloman, 2002, p. 379). The distinction is a recognition that the individual can think 
and decide either through a deliberately analytical and logical process or an intuitive 
process that minimizes cognitive effort. In this research, the two processes will be labelled 
System 1 and System 2 which respectively represent the separate intuition and analytical 
reasoning processes (Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 658). Figure 3 provides descriptions of 
the two processes and perception against the types of content that they predominantly 
handle (Kahneman, 2003, p. 698). It should be noted that in the assignment of numbers to 
the two systems, intuition comes first (System 1) and reasoning comes second (System 2). 
This is reflective of the automatic and pervasive nature of System 1 and indicates that 
System 2 outputs are produced more slowly than those of System 1 (Epstein et al., 1992, 
p. 334). This position after System 1 allows System 2 to function as a check on the 
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reasonableness of the System 1 output and override it when necessary (Stanovich & West, 
2000, p. 662). There are situations where System 2 is engaged immediately after perception 
receives and recognizes data from the environment around that requires analytical thinking 
(e.g., a calculus test, assessing a mortgage contract, etc.), but in general the effortless nature 
of System 1 will engage first (Kahneman, 2003, p. 698).  
 
Figure 3. Processes and Content of Perception, Intuition, and Reasoning. 
Source: Kahneman (2003, p. 698). 
These dual processes are illustrated in Figure 4, with emphasis being placed on the 
unknown heuristic which System 1 used. The decision maker automatically utilizes the 
System 1 heuristic substitution process to produce a decision. In the illustration, the cloud 
indicates that the System 1 output is not based upon the true target attribute (e.g., 
probability) but instead by the heuristic attribute (e.g., representativeness). System 2 
provides a rapid assessment of the System 1 output, checking for reasonableness which 
does not inherently mean that it is checking why System 1 produced that output. If the 
output is deemed reasonable, the decision is used; if not, the slow and effortful System 2 
is used to develop a decision. 
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Figure 4. Heuristic Substitution as a Component of Dual Process Theory. 
A discussion of heuristics and biases must also recognize their limitations as a 
means of identifying when to be concerned about their use. Voluminous reading of 
heuristics and biases literature can cause the reader to believe that individuals have no 
ability to intuitively arrive at correct responses; a brief moment of self-reflection will show 
numerous occasions where intuitive decisions produce correct outcomes. A longer moment 
of self-reflection will show that the belief about the total fallibility of individuals and 
intuitive thinking is itself the confirmation bias because the reader is steeped in literature 
primarily describing decision errors and not successes. In an article co-authored by the 
leading proponent for heuristics and biases, Daniel Kahneman, and the leading proponent 
for natural decision making (a theory which treats intuitive decision making as a skill that 
can be honed), Gary Klein, both authors agree that intuitive decisions can produce excellent 
outcomes and predictable errors and that these are reflective of the individuals making the 
decisions and the environments around them (Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 515). This 
congruence could be surprising given that the term ‘bias’ is described as a controversial 
term in the same article (Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 515). The underpinning of their 
agreement is that certain decisions are placed within highly valid settings, that is there are 
consistently predictable outcomes from consistent decisions that are consistently cued 
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(Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 520). Chess can be considered a highly valid situation; all 
pieces are visible, their movement capabilities are known, and these factors do not differ 
between games of chess. The unpredictability in chess, the opponent, does not invalidate 
the situation; over time, the skilled player develops a familiarity with the situation that 
incorporates opponent actions as part of the situational cues. At the other end of the 
continuum are highly invalid environments, where the complexity of action-reaction 
further inhibits situational cues from priming an appropriate decision which prevents truly 
skilled intuition from developing (Hogarth, 2001, p. 90). Long-term political forecasting 
falls within an invalid environment due to the scale and complexity of the system 
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 520). Of particular relevance to this thesis, the tactical level 
of war is specifically listed as a highly valid environment despite its inherent uncertainty 
because consistently advantageous actions exist that produce further opportunities to gain 
an advantage (Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 524). Tactical actions such as flanking, 
suppressing, or isolating generally produce the same outcomes, allowing the tactical leader 
to learn and apply experience across future fights. Thus, military decision makers can 
develop intuitive decision making as a skill, but should also recognize that there is a limit 
to using intuition. One such instance is when the validity of the environment decreases, 
which should be expected when fighting against a new adversary with new systems in a 
new battlespace (e.g., cyberspace or in orbit). As the novelty of the situation declines 
through continued exploration and operations, its validity is revealed and intuition can 
again be counted as a useful tool. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Human cognition is an immensely complex collection of processes, of which this 
chapter has provided an introductory understanding of some related to judgments and 
decision making. The perception of a situation and subsequent judgments and decisions 
made in that space are based on the understanding of the data available to the decision 
maker. Schemas help make sense of incoming data by using pre-existing knowledge and 
experience to attach meaning and turn it into information. Schemas can be primed, and 
therefore create opportunity to influence someone’s perception of data. The perception of 
that data informs the individual’s use of either System 1 intuition or System 2 analysis. The 
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effortlessness of intuitive decision making comes from automatic heuristic substitution, 
which introduces a potential for cognitive biases to produce a flawed outcome that is not 
caught by the System 2 check for reasonableness. Understanding these processes permits 
extension onto how humans assess and develop trust in AIs, and how that trust can be 
deliberately influenced to decrease the effectiveness of a HAT. 
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III. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will introduce artificial intelligence, describing both its competence 
and ability to be compromised. This binary classification provides the foundation for 
Chapter IV to determine whether trust within a HAT is justified or unjustified. AI 
represents the forefront of computing technologies and is appropriately complex given that 
position. Thus, the following sections in Chapter III should be read for conceptual 
understanding of AI as a system and its subcomponents.  
B. NARROW AI  
1. Narrow versus General 
AI is a holistic term that comprises several major components and can be 
conceptually organized in a number of ways. Fundamentally, AI is a combination of 
datasets, algorithms, software, and hardware (Denning, 2019a, p. 18). It should be noted 
that the term ‘data’ and ‘dataset’ are not interchangeable; ‘data’ retains the definition 
assigned in Chapter II while ‘dataset’ is more aligned with the Chapter II definition of 
information because it is a collection of data that contains meaning. The interplay of these 
components varies based upon the AI, but they are the fundamental building blocks present 
in all AI. In this research, AI will be used as a system level term as well as an adjective for 
components, namely algorithms, that bear additional significance within the AI.  
Within the scope of this thesis, the term AI will solely represent a Narrow AI and not 
a General AI. A Narrow AI is a computer system (comprising the components of the Canonical 
Architecture) that performs tasks which augment human intelligence, such as perceiving, 
learning, classifying, abstracting, reasoning, and acting (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 9). General 
AI, also called Aspirational AI, is the science fiction representation of AI. No longer limited to 
a single task, it can seamlessly exist and navigate in physical and informational environments. 
These definitions set a limit to the extent of the capabilities of the AI: by augmenting human 
intelligence, a narrow AI does not replicate or replace the total capabilities of the brain. The 
human brain does serve as an inspiration for certain types of algorithms, a design that has 
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enabled those AIs to exceed the performance of the human mind in specific tasks. Implied by 
the name, Narrow AIs are developed for a particular task or set of tasks and often become 
fragile and useless when applied outside that task (Apte, 2019, p. 15). One analogy for Narrow 
AI is a razor blade; it is excellent in a limited number of situations such as shaving or 
performing surgical cutting, but would be completely useless if used to cut down a tree. A 
similar analogy for General AI is to consider it as a replacement lumberjack; it will be able to 
decide and then use the proper tool to cut down the tree. There are currently no known General 
AIs, therefore they will not be considered in this thesis. It cannot be ruled out that General AIs 
will be developed in the future as Narrow AIs have consistently met and surpassed 
developmental hurdles (Rowe, 2019, p. 9). 
2. Basic Structure 
Within Narrow AI, there are a number of fundamental components that can be 
assumed to be part of any AI. One concept of these core components is the Lincoln 
Laboratory’s AI Canonical Architecture, seen in Figure 5 (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 27). 
The extension elements are Human-Machine Teaming, which in this thesis is referred to as 
Human-AI Teaming (HAT), Robust AI, and Users. These were added to the AI structure 
because of the necessity of the AI to integrate with humans. HAT is a design and operation 
paradigm that assists in identifying tasks are most suitable for humans or most suitable for 
the AI. Robust AI is the Lincoln Laboratory term for a trustworthy AI that demonstrates 
its trustworthiness by being explainable, meaningfully measurable, verifiably tested, 
resilient to attack, and deployed within organizational policies that empower the use of AI 
within HAT (Martinez et al., 2019, pp. 62–65). Chapter IV will highlight that AIs can be 
trusted even in the absence of the Robust AI traits because of trust factors that are not based 
on these traits, making it all the more critical for designers to produce systems which meet 
this expectation. Lincoln Laboratory’s architecture will be used to frame the remainder of 
this chapter, with specific emphasis on the data sets and algorithms. 
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Figure 5. AI Canonical Architecture. Source: Martinez et al. (2019, p. 27). 
The three major phases for an AI’s lifetime are the design, training, and operational 
phases. The training phase is where the machine learning takes place and how AI differs 
from traditional computer programs. Training depends upon the type of algorithm being 
used, but generally means that the designed algorithm processes relationships amongst a 
variety of specific data inputs to learn which relationships achieve the designer’s identified 
desired output. This training is often conducted through multiple iterations of data input 
and data output, which allow the designers to adjust parameters within the design to better 
guide the learning. Once the model has achieved the desired output, it can be transitioned 
into its operational mode where it will process its data inputs in accordance with the 
structure that it acquired during training.  
C. DATA, DATA SCIENCE, AND DATABASES 
1. Data  
The first major component that will be discussed is data. Datasets are the collection 
of inputs that are evaluated by the AI algorithm that then produces the output. Datasets and 
their relation to AI algorithms are often described in food terms like ‘fed’ or ‘raw’ and 
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these parallels are instructive to the necessity of datasets to AI. The two major types of data 
that fill databases are unstructured and structured data. Unstructured data are collections of 
single objects without context that are often the outputs of sensors (Martinez et al., 2019, 
p. 43). Structured data are more closely related to the Chapter II definition for information 
because they are typically packets that contain various pieces of datum, often referred to 
as metadata (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 43). Structured data predominantly comes from 
information systems like social media. The expected environment and desired goal of the 
AI will determine which type of data the AI will need. 
2. Data Science and Databases 
Data Science, as an academic discipline and profession, is best suited for those 
determinations because it concerns itself with data analysis, the building of models that 
correctly apply datasets to accurately predict events, and the validation of those models 
(Schuchard, 2019, p. 3). Data scientists are needed because of the challenges associated 
with data conditioning and database construction. Data conditioning, or data munging, 
intends to modify the ‘raw’ data into a form that retains its necessary value while being 
manageable in the dataset and can also be manipulated by the algorithm. An important 
modification that is required for supervised-learning algorithms is the assignment of labels, 
which in most cases requires manual assignment at the outset of a database development 
(Martinez et al., 2019, p. 49). Other data modifications are necessary so that the data can 
be organized, stored, and accurately recalled within the datasets according to the software 
language used to code the dataset; examples of those languages include the Structured 
Query Language (SQL), Not SQL (NoSQL), New SQL (NewSQL), and a variety of 
combinations meant to store both structured and unstructured data from multiple sources 
within the same dataset (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 39). The era of Big Data has demanded 
some of these developments. Three major factors, the volume of data being received, the 
rate at which that volume arrives at the dataset (i.e., periodic deliveries or continuous flow), 
and the variety of data being received and assigned to the dataset (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 
38). Figure 6 provides a visualization for the scale of Big Data by describing a portion of 
the data produced in the average minute in 2020 (DOMO, 2021, end of article). Expanding 
the food parallel, datasets generally follow the ‘garbage in, garbage out’ maxim: poorly 
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conditioned data will likely produce useless outputs. Such is the criticality of data 
conditioning that weeks and potentially months of an AI development project can be 
consumed by the data munging process, potentially 80% of the development project’s 
lifespan (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 38).  
 
Figure 6. The Average Data per Minute in 2020. Source: DOMO (2021). 
D. ALGORITHMS 
Algorithms are the mathematical models which are used to evaluate the data and 
datasets that are fed into the AI. Attempting to differentiate amongst the types of algorithms 
on the basis of ‘intelligence’ is inexact because of the multitude of ways to define intelligence 
and its intrinsic linkage with human cognition (Denning, 2019b, p. 6). A better means of 
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describing the hierarchy of AI algorithms is by their learning power which is the ability to 
acquire new capacity for action (Denning, 2019b, pp. 2–3). Using this method, the AI Group 
at Naval Postgraduate School produced the following six hierarchical levels of learning with 
their respective algorithm types and dataset requirements, shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Hierarchical Levels of Learning and their Respective Algorithm 
Types and Dataset Requirements. Adapted from Denning (2019b, p. 2). 
 
 
In general, the table shows broad similarity with the AI Canonical Architecture. 
Level 0 is basic automation and is represented by systems like traditional computers which 
receive inputs to perform a task that will produce a consistent output (Denning, 2019b, p. 
13). Level 1 is rule-based or expert systems, which produce outputs based upon a manually 
structured logical deduction which considers the input against the static dataset (Denning, 
2019b, p. 14). Level 2 is supervised learning, which utilizes neural networks and a labeled 
training dataset to learn a desired output and then evaluate inputs based upon the learned 
features of the training dataset (Denning, 2019b, p. 15). In relation to this hierarchy, Level 
2 is where the term ‘Machine Learning’ begins because it is the first level where the system 
develops its own process for achieving its task. Level 3 is unsupervised learning, which 
utilizes neural networks and an un-labeled dataset to generate a desired output based upon 
associations inferred by the AI algorithm (Denning, 2019b, p. 16). The AI Canonical 
Architecture identifies a specific usage of unsupervised learning called reinforcement 
learning, which will be discussed separately in this thesis. Level 4 is Human-Machine 
Teaming (HAT in this thesis) and contains in its use of Levels 0–3 the ability to learn how 
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to augment and aid its human companion or user (Denning, 2019b, p. 17). This is the only 
level that would not be regarded by the Canonical Architecture of AI as an AI algorithm 
because the Canonical Architecture separates HAT from the algorithms because of its task 
assignment requirement. This thesis will discuss HAT in alignment with the Canonical 
Architecture. Level 5 is Aspirational or General AI which was discussed in Section B of 
this chapter and has yet to be achieved. The following subsections will describe Levels 1–
3 with an additional subsection for both neural networks and reinforcement learning. Level 
4 will topically be covered in the opening sections of Chapter IV. 
1. Level 1: Rule-Based System  
Ruled-Based or Expert Systems are the most basic form of AI, despite their 
immense complexity in design. The major separation between a rule-based system and a 
Level 2 and higher system based on neural networks is that the rule-based system has a 
fixed knowledge base and can only learn when taught specific new knowledge 
relationships by its designers (Monaco, 2019, p. 13). This means that the knowledge base 
must be created by a knowledgeable expert who must prescribe not only the data objects 
but their relationships to each other in a logical manner that the algorithm can then use to 
reason for its outputs (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 46). This requirement is both an advantage 
and a major hindrance to the use of rule-based systems. The time requirement for the 
development and updating of the knowledge base is extensive, as seen with the preeminent 
rule-based system developer Cycorp, which has spent 35 years producing and managing 
its knowledgebase; a simplified representation of the design of their knowledge base and 
how it moves from high level concepts to arbitrary facts is shown in Figure 7 (Cycorp, 
2021, third heading). There are also issues with the ability of an expert to identify an 
association among large quantities of data with minute differences in one dimension and 
massive differences in another. Viewed by advocates of neural networks, these sort of 
complex problems are best solved using learning instead of programming, if there is 
sufficient computation power and data available (Krizhevsky et al., 2017, p. 84) The use 
of a manually constructed knowledge base does produce an AI that is computationally 
cheap, because the system must only follow the logical relations written into the knowledge 
base instead of developing its own processes that require numerous iterations of complex, 
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parallel operations (Monaco, 2019, p. 18). Because these rules are written by the human 
designer, the relationships can be used by the rule-based system to explain why it made a 
specific decision (Monaco, 2019, p. 18). This is a highly desirable trait that presents a major 
hurdle for most neural network-based AI algorithms. 
 
Figure 7. Cycorp’s Knowledgebase. Source: Monaco (2019, p. 17).  
2. Level 2 and Beyond: Neural Networks  
Neural Networks (NN) provide the mathematical foundation for computers to learn 
as a capability instead of simply receiving knowledge through teaching. A brief 
introduction is needed as NNs are fundamental to the subsections on level 2 supervised 
learning, level 3 unsupervised, and level 3 reinforcement learning. NNs are filled with 
mathematical neurons, which are modeled on the biological brain’s neurons and their 
connections to each other. A visualization of the mathematical neuron and its inspiration, 
the biological neuron, is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Comparison of a Biological Neuron and a Mathematical Neuron. 
Source: Orescanin (2019, p. 10). 
The mathematical neuron is a summation function within a network layer that 
receives multiple input ‘signals’ or values; this reception is modeled on the biological 
neuron’s dendrites receipt of electrical impulses from other neurons or nerves. Those 
values are assigned a scaling weight and added with a scaled bias, the sum of which is 
evaluated at an activation function that produces an output value for the neuron. The 
outcome of that activation function is either the final algorithm output or the input into the 
next layer (Orescanin, 2019, p. 10). This function is shown in the equation below (Martinez 
et al., 2019, p. 51). 
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Two advanced implementations of NN are the deep neural network (DNN) and the 
convolutional neural network (CNN). DNNs expand the NN by inserting a number of 
hidden layers between the input and output layers that each perform evaluations that then 
pass through the following layers and eventually arrive at the output layer (DeepAI, 2019, 
second heading). Because of the increased number of layers available, DNNs can 
incorporate 108 parameters, permitting non-deterministic and extremely under-constrained 
optimizations (Kölsch, 2019, p. 7). It is generally understood that more hidden layers will 
produce better outputs (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 52). Figure 9 shows a NN and a DNN 
(DeepAI, 2019, second heading). 
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Figure 9. Comparison of a Simple Neural Network and a Deep Neural 
Network. Source: DeepAI (2019). 
The CNN is a DNN that uses the mathematical convolution operation as a hidden 
layer where it manipulates the input data dimensions and then uses a pooled collection of 
those convolved outputs as the input for additional convolutional layers and finally into 
traditional, fully-connected neural network hidden layers (Li et al., 2020, architecture 
overview heading). Figure 10 shows the architecture of a CNN used for image classification; 
the salient feature of this figure is the change of dimension between each layer due to the 
convolution operations performed at the hidden layers (Krizhevsky et al., 2017, p. 87). This 
specific architecture was one of the first successful CNNs and significantly outperformed 
DNNs in image classification tasks (Krizhevsky et al., 2017, p. 88). 
 
Figure 10. Change of Dimensions within a Convolutional Neural Network. 
Source: Krizhevsky et al. (2017, p. 87). 
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3. Level 2: Supervised Learning 
Supervised Learning (SL) is a NN usage that utilizes labeled training datasets and 
defined labels to produce a learned model capable of classifying an object (Orescanin, 
2019, p. 6). The focus is on the dataset and its labeling before being fed into the AI 
algorithm for the algorithm to learn the associative links between the object and its assigned 
labels (Orescanin, 2019, p. 6). The labeling of a dataset for supervised learning is one of 
the major time consuming factors associated with data conditioning, because of the 
necessity for high quality labeling (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 49). After the algorithm is 
trained with the labeled data set, it is able to use k-nearest neighbor operations to classify 
the object based upon the available labels (Peterson, 2009, p. 1883). As seen in the Neural 
Network section in the CNN example, supervised learning is exceptional in object 
recognition, if trained on a high-quality dataset. This high performance is also seen in the 
use of supervised DNNs trained to identify fractures, which improved physician 
identification of fractures in x-rays from 80.8% to 91.5% (Lindsey et al., 2018, p. 11591).  
4. Level 3: Unsupervised Learning  
Unsupervised learning (UL) utilizes NNs with training datasets which do not have 
explicit data labels provided (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 49). This does not mean that a dataset 
does not need to be conditioned, only that labels have not been assigned to the data objects. 
Considering that dataset preparation is a time consuming and labor intensive task, the 
removal of the requirement for labeled data is a significant advantage for unsupervised 
learning. One of the primary uses for unsupervised learning is the clustering of dataset 
objects based upon similarities within a dimension, which is useful for data conditioning 
as a starting place for the creation of a labeled data set (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 49). 
Dimensionality reduction can take place using an unsupervised NN to determine how a 
dataset distribution could be manipulated into a lower dimension while retaining its data 
values (Martinez et al., 2019, pp. 50–51). This idea, called Principal Component Analysis, 
can be seen in Figure 11, where the data originally distributed across axes X1 and X2 could 
instead be represented across axis Y1, with minor variation along axis Y2; since the 
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distribution along Y1 is much greater than the distribution along Y2, the values along Y2 
can be assumed to be trivial (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 50). 
 
Figure 11. Reduction of Dimensions through Principal Component Analysis. 
Source: Martinez et al. (2019, p. 50). 
Separate from data conditioning tasks, two applications of unsupervised learning 
applications are neural autoencoders and Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). A 
neural autoencoder is an algorithm that is designed to reproduce the input dataset 
identically, without being able to ‘copy and paste’ the input as the output; (C. Darken, 
2019, p. 8). Once the algorithm is trained and accurately reproducing the training dataset, 
it can then be given data sets for inference; if the new dataset is not identical to the training 
set, the output of the algorithm will not be identical to the training set and the system will 
flag that new dataset as anomalous (C. Darken, 2019, p. 7). Neural autoencoders are useful 
for predicting system failures because of their ability to indicate when that system is no 
longer functioning nominally but has not yet failed. By recognizing anomalous behavior 
through an imperfect AI output, catastrophic failure can be avoided (C. Darken, 2019, p. 
5). GANs take this a step further and utilize two NNs, one as a generator and the other as 
a discriminator which assesses the output of the generator, a function that is generally 
performed by the user when utilizing a neural autoencoder. Conceptually, these two 
unsupervised NNs are in a competition; the generator attempts to produce a training set 
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object which is then evaluated by the discriminator to determine the probability that its 
input is from the training dataset or from the generator (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 52). Both 
NNs will improve as training continues until the generator produces an output that causes 
the discriminator to assign a probability of 0.5 to the object (Goodfellow et al., 2014, p. 1). 
Reinforcement learning (RL) is another form of unsupervised learning that divides 
the overall task for the AI into individual states with specific actions for that state and then 
uses a designer defined output to guide the algorithm through those states towards the 
defined output. The state representation is the information status of the task at a given 
moment in time; for a game like chess, each turn would be its own state and includes the 
available actions. A score is assigned to the AI’s performance after every action, indicating 
how well the AI is performing. The NN is designed with the objective to complete the 
overall task and to maximize the score value at task completion; it is not enough to 
complete the task, it must complete it well (C. Darken, 2019, pp. 12–15). This design 
performs well in a highly valid (well defined actions and rules) and highly variable (many 
sequences and combinations of actions) environment, where each iteration of training 
permits the AI algorithm to apply the learned score values of the previous iteration to its 
current attempt (C. Darken, 2019, p. 11). A significant challenge of properly developing a 
RL algorithm is how to best parameterize the NN and what score values should be assigned 
to a state representation (C. Darken, 2019, p. 19). Part of the challenge comes from delayed 
feedback because the algorithm must complete the overall task to receive a final score and 
then attempt to improve its score by changing actions during the various state 
representations (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 54). The delay in feedback and the total length of 
time to train increases greatly as the variability and the number of possible states increases 
(Martinez et al., 2019, p. 54). An example of a successful RL algorithm is AlphaZero, 
which used a DNN-RL design to learn how to play chess, Shogi, and Go simply by random 
play with no domain knowledge except for the rules (Silver et al., 2018, p. 1140). Most 
notable in its performance is that this single algorithm was able to beat the reigning AI 
champions for each game, all of which had been specifically crafted for that particular 
game; the chess champion was beaten with 9 hours of training, the Shogi champion with 
12 hours of training, and the Go champion with 13 days of training (Silver et al., 2018, pp. 
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1142, 144). The significant increase in training time needed reflects the increased 
variability associated with each game. 
E. SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE 
For this thesis, the value of advancements in software and hardware in relation to 
AI must be acknowledged for completeness but will not be investigated. Because AI is 
fundamentally a computational task, advancements in computing have benefited as the 
technologies related to both software and hardware have developed. Because all computers 
rely upon physical circuitry at their most basic layer, the design of a processing chip can 
greatly improve performance in the completion of its task provided the chip design is paired 
to the types of operations that will be performed. The advent of graphics processing units 
(GPU) meant primarily for improving the performance of computers in rapidly rendering 
digital images have also allowed AI developers to take advantage of hardware designed for 
parallel computations of vectors and matrices (Orescanin, 2019, p. 15). Application 
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) such as Google’s Tensor Processing Unit (TPU) have 
also been developed with a focus on rapid parallel vector calculations, except that these are 
specifically meant for complementary software developed by the same companies to best 
enable performance in AI tasks (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 57). These types of hardware and 
software developments have permitted higher performance and will likely continue to 
enable the trend of more and more capable AIs. 
F. COMPROMISED AI 
AI is not infallible and must be carefully designed, implemented, and secured to 
ensure that it is consistently able to perform its assigned tasks. Lincoln Laboratory 
considers an AI that meets these standards to be a Robust AI, resilient in the presence of 
security threats and properly designed to ensure that it integrates well with the humans that 
use it (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 62). This section will address how an AI can be 
compromised, either intentionally or unintentionally.  
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1. Poor Design and Implementation 
AIs are highly complex systems that require thorough and careful design and proper 
usage in order to function as intended. Functioning as intended is a critical qualification 
for this research, because it is possible for the AI to complete the task without procedural 
errors but to produce a useless output because the AI was not adequately designed to 
produce the correct output. Poorly managed databases and training sets can produce a 
variety of errors, including selection and labeling. Selection bias results from having the 
wrong data or not knowing that the wrong data is present in the database, which means the 
training set is non-representative of the test data or that the trends within the data are 
misrepresented (Schuchard, 2019, p. 10). Labeling bias can result from human error, due 
to input mistakes or a lack of data understanding, as well as from machine error, due to 
data misrepresentation in the analysis algorithm (Schuchard, 2019, p. 11). AI can also be 
compromised by faults in the measurements of the outputs meant to determine if the 
assigned task has been sufficiently accomplished (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 64). These 
measurements, known as metrics, must be defined by the designers to indicate the level of 
system or component performance. It is not enough to make a valid measurement; it must 
be the correct-valid measurement. Within supervised learning, combinations of true and 
false positives and negatives must be adequately described to ensure that recommendations 
made by the system are always true (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 64). Within unsupervised 
learning, the correct ratios for the desired output must be what are actually computed by 
the AI algorithm, be it the intra-cluster distances versus the inter-cluster distance or the 
distance between cluster centroids (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 64). While the development of 
component level metrics is a task with an engineering solution, system level metrics, those 
which measure the holistic performance of the AI, are more ambiguous. Both flaws in the 
datasets and the metrics can prevent an AI from performing as intended, even without the 
presence of an adversarial threat. 
2. Security  
Machine and network security are longstanding practices that extend to the 
development and use of AI. Because AI is a component of a larger information system, 
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good AI security must begin with good network security. This is especially true for AIs 
designed for use in military HAT structures because they will likely be targeted by 
advanced persistent threats, which are typically nation-state funded attackers with the 
resources, skills, and time needed to plan and execute highly successful cyber operations 
(National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021, p. 12). Each core tenet of 
the information security triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability can be degraded 
within both the larger network and the AI. Specific to the AI, confidentiality violations 
occur when the attacker is able to steal information and derive knowledge about the dataset, 
the algorithm, or potentially both (Tabassi et al., 2019). Integrity violations occur when the 
attacker is able to manipulate the algorithm, producing misclassifications for SL, 
meaningless data representations in UL, and unintelligent or degraded performance in RL 
(Tabassi et al., 2019, p. 10). Availability violations occur when the attacker is able to slow 
the testing speed or prevent access to the AI (Tabassi et al., 2019, p. 10). Threats are the 
means by which attackers cause these violations, which the designer and operator want to 
prevent. Because AIs are themselves components of larger information systems and 
networks, many of the attacks on those systems can also be used as attacks on the AI, as 
seen in Table 2 (MITRE, 2020a, middle of post). The white cells represent attack methods 
found in MITRE’s ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix, a 204 entry matrix that catalogues attack 
types against non-AI based networks and computers (MITRE, 2021, interactive website).  
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Table 2. Adversarial Machine Learning Threat Matrix. Adapted from 
MITRE (2020a). 
 
Cells with a gray fill indicate attack methods specific to AI.  
Cells with a white fill indicate attack methods that are derived from attack methods against non-AI 
networks and computers.  
3. Artificial Intelligence Specific Threats 
Due to their unique designs and functions, there are also attack threats that are 
specific to AI. The National Institute of Standards and Technology developed a taxonomy 
for classifying AI attacks, defenses, and consequences, seen in Figure 12 (Tabassi et al., 
2019, p. 4). Of specific interest to this subsection is the left half of the diagram, which 
contains the targets, techniques, and knowledge subcomponents which comprise an attack 
on AI. Not all combinations are valid, but any attack must have a level of knowledge of its 
target to inform which technique can be applied. In a collection of case reports on attacks 
on AI, one of the trends to emerge is the consistency of multiple attack types being used to 
achieve a successful attack on the AI (MITRE, 2020b, case studies page). The following 
paragraphs will briefly describe attacks against supervised and reinforcement learning 
algorithms. While these three attacks are not exhaustive, they represent the ability for 




Figure 12. Adversarial Machine Learning Attacks, Defenses, and Consequences. Source: Tabassi et al. (2019, p. 4). 
35 
One such attack against a supervised learning algorithm highlights the combination 
of traditional cyber attacks and those specifically focused against AIs. In this attack, the 
attackers were able to determine that the designers outsourced the training of their model 
to a networked third-party because of the computational requirements of the dataset and 
algorithm (Gu et al., 2019, p. 47230). Using that knowledge, the attackers were able to 
maliciously train an algorithm “BadNet” that provided excellent performance on the 
training and validation sets yet behaved erratically on deliberate data triggers (Gu et al., 
2019, p. 47230). This poisoned model was then delivered to the original designers, instead 
of a trained and validated version of their AI. This represents an abuse of external remote 
services and an exploitation of a public facing application, because the public knowledge 
of the training and validation datasets permitted the attackers sufficient knowledge to then 
attack the targeted model. These techniques are not unique to attacks targeted at AI, but 
their use permits the poisoning of the algorithm.  
In another attack against a supervised learning algorithm, attackers conducted a 
data poisoning attack against an AI performing image identification. These attackers were 
able to insert specifically generated image perturbations based on other specific labels 
within the dataset to consistently and confidently misclassify tested objects (Graves, 2020, 
pp. xvii–xviii). While the tested images appear identical to the human eye, they are 
classified or misclassified differently as illustrated in Figure 13 (Graves, 2020, p. 51). This 
disconnect produces a significant problem if the AI is part of a HAT, because this 
misclassification is immediately obvious to the user. Chapter IV will highlight that task 
performance is a significant trust factor for the development of the user’s trust in AI and 
an error such as this could significantly damage the trustworthiness of the AI. 
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Figure 13. Comparison of the Classification Results of the Original Image and a 
Color Aware Targeted Attack Image. Source: Graves (2020, p. 51). 
Reinforcement learning algorithms are also susceptible to attack, albeit of a 
different type. In one such attack, the attacker was able to develop an enchanting attack 
against a RL algorithm, which lures the AI towards a designated target state by using a 
generative model to predict the possible future states and a planning algorithm to determine 
the actions necessary to draw the AI towards that designated target state (Tabassi et al., 
2019, p. 15). These attackers were able to successfully divert the trained AI towards the 
designated target state in 70% of attempts across three Atari games the AI was trained to 
successfully complete (Lin et al., 2019, p. 6).  
37 
G. CONCLUSION 
Narrow AIs represent a major technological step forward for computers. While AI 
designers must apply significant effort to properly developing datasets and algorithms, the 
inherent learning capability creates a system that can maximize the performance of those 
architectures beyond the direct capability of a user. This incredible potential should not 
obfuscate a fundamental truth; Narrow AI is a highly specialized machine that can be 
poorly designed or maliciously compromised. Military planners should recognize the 
vulnerabilities associated with AIs and consider them as part of an adversary’s total attack 
surface. The juxtaposition of competent or compromised AIs will be examined in Chapter 
IV to form a basis for how military planners can attack a human-AI team. 
  
38 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
39 
IV. INFLUENCING TRUST IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Human-AI trust is a critical requirement to achieve the maximum team performance 
and is developed through a variety of factors. It is the objective of this chapter to describe 
that these factors can also be targeted to decrease the overall HAT effectiveness. The focus 
will be on applying the Chapter III assertion that AIs can be categorized as either competent 
or compromised based on the user’s perception of the AI’s trustworthiness. Matched 
correctly, the changes in trust will degrade the HAT’s accomplishment of its mission. As 
a component of an adversary’s military effort, this degradation will decrease the combat 
power of the adversary relative to the attacker.  
B. HUMAN AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMING 
1. Complementary Teaming 
The fundamental reason for human and AI teaming is the potential for an increase 
in overall performance through the complementary pairing of human and AI strength and 
weaknesses. Many of the strengths that AI have in comparison to humans are a result of 
their computational and logical foundation, which enables high performance in 
calculations, comparisons, and logic application (R. Darken, 2019, p. 11). It is the ability 
of an AI to be able to perform these tasks on massive datasets across many iterations that 
make them the stronger member of the team in this regard (R. Darken, 2019, p. 11). An 
exemplar of this can be seen in the application of DNN algorithms to assist doctors in 
identifying fractures in x-rays; performance of this task improved from a detection rate of 
80.8% to 91.5% with the assistance of the algorithm (Lindsey et al., 2018, p. 11591). 
Insurance fraud detection is another area where the ability of AI algorithms to detect minute 
trends in large quantities of data over time has provided insurance investigators a tool 
capable of 75% accuracy in its detection, leading to a better application of investigator time 
and effort (Shift, 2021, p. 1). 
Conversely, there are a variety of tasks where the intelligence of humans stands out 
in comparison to the learning of AIs. One example is an AI’s misclassification of street 
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signs due to the presence of small squares of tape on the face of the sign (Eykholt et al., 
2018, p. 1). The placement of the tape on the sign followed deliberate patterns produced 
by another algorithm meant to trick the detection algorithm into misclassification a stop 
sign as a speed limit sign, at a success rate ranging from 67% to 100% (Eykholt et al., 2018, 
pp. 6–9). As seen on the right in Figure 14, the placement of the tape does not impede a 
human’s proper classification of the object (Eykholt et al., 2018, p. 2). This sort of error 
stems from the narrow nature of AI; it is only capable of high task performance on datasets 
that were representative of its training datasets. AIs becomes fragile the further inputs 
become from the training dataset and lacks the contextual intelligence and learning that a 
human is able to employ when encountering a novel situation (Apte, 2019, p. 15).  
  
Figure 14. Tape Placement that Caused AI Mis-classification. Source: 
Eykholt et al. (2018, p. 2). 
Lack of context also extends beyond a physical recognition of objects within their 
surroundings and into the appropriateness of an action based upon societal or interpersonal 
norms. In 2016, Microsoft developed a chatbot named MS Tay that utilized AI to generate 
tweets and replies from other Twitter accounts (Schwartz, 2019, para. 1). The AI was 
designed to continue learning after its public debut based upon interactions with other 
twitter users, a feature which became a vulnerability once a loosely coordinated group of 
trolls discovered how to exploit a developer command that caused MS Tay to repeat 
whatever was tweeted at it (Schwartz, 2019, para. 8). This group then flooded MS Tay with 
offensive and violent tweets which the AI retweeted under its own handle and incorporated 
into its lexicon for use in constructing replies to other Twitter users (Davis, 2016, p. 23). 
Sixteen hours and 95,000 tweets later, Microsoft suspended the MS Tay account (Schwartz, 
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2019, para. 6). The Microsoft apology for MS Tay acknowledged that the AI’s tweets did 
not reflect the values or design principles of the company or its design team (P. Lee, 2016, 
para. 1). As a part of the design process, the developers had identified topics which MS 
Tay would bypass, but these topics were not generalized throughout the AI as norms and 
could thus be superseded by the tweets learned from the malicious attackers (Davis, 2016, 
p. 23). This incident underscores the current inability for AIs to adequately grasp what 
constitute good and bad influences which are necessary for the formation of an 
understanding of societal or interpersonal norms. Thus, serious consideration must be given 
to determining the capabilities of the user and the AI and then aligning those capabilities 
to specific tasks within the HAT’s mission.  
2. Task Suitability and Mapping 
To maximize the performance of the HAT, tasks must be properly evaluated and 
assigned to the team-member best suited to perform them. The division of tasks reflects a 
gradient of the seriousness of the consequence of the action and the confidence in the 
system’s performance, which is represented in Figure 15 (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 68). 
Within this gradient, an organization’s willingness to accept risk is inherently a component 
of the consequences of the action. During the design of the team, the organization must 
identify what tasks it holds to be sufficiently important or beyond the ability of the AI and 
then align those with the human; all remaining tasks should be given to the AI (R. Darken, 
2019, pp. 7–9). Human Computation is a field of research which seeks to identify tasks 
which require human intelligence, be it contextualization or emotional, because they cannot 
yet be accomplished by a computer (Quinn & Bederson, 2011, p. 1404). Whatever the 
method of determination is, a clear understanding of task mapping is necessary to ensure 
that the HAT is able to make complementary use of the strengths of each. 
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Figure 15. Severity of Consequences and Confidence in System’s 
Performance. Source: Martinez et al. (2019, p. 68). 
3. Metrics 
A component of properly assigning tasks to an AI is determining how well it 
performs on those tasks. These metrics are typically considered to be at the component 
(e.g., database, algorithm, et cetera) or system level (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 64). At a 
component level, metrics are relatively simple to develop. Within learning algorithms, 
supervised learning can be measured on accuracy, precision, or recall performance whereas 
unsupervised learning can be evaluated on its intra-cluster distance versus inter-cluster 
distance, distance between cluster centroids, or mutual information present in the data 
objects (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 64). At a system level, metrics become more difficult to 
identify and the practice becomes a function of project management’s triple constraint on 
scope represented by the equation below (Heagney, 2011, p. 9). In system level metrics for 
AI, the scope represents the tasks mapped to it and must be supported by an accurate 
understanding of those levels of component performance. These metrics are project 
dependent, based on the actual interactions of performance, cost, and time, but the key 
concept with this representation is that a change in one will cause a change in at least one 
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other. Thus, a choice must be made about the scope of the AI tasks based upon its 
performance of those tasks and the cost and time requirements to achieve the desired levels 
of performance. 
( ), ,
 scope,  performance,  Time or schedule





C. TRUST IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
1. Human Trust 
Trust is a complex part of human-human interaction which can be carefully 
extended onto HAT. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman define trust as 
the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party. (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712) 
Key to this definition is exposure to risk, the idea of willingly accepting a level of 
vulnerability. (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712). If there is no potential for a loss due to the failure 
of the trustee, then there is no need for trust. While this definition was proposed for 
organizational trust, the tenets apply to the human within HAT as well. As a part of a HAT 
with maximized task mapping, the human expects the AI to produce certain categorical 
outputs and will be unable to complete the objectives assigned to the HAT without them. 
Within a HAT, the human trustor does not have the ability to usefully monitor the processes 
that the AI algorithm is performing. This inability to usefully monitor an AI algorithm in 
progress is seen in Figure 16, which is the output of the first convolution layer in a CNN 
designed for image identification (Krizhevsky et al., 2017, p. 89). The output of this layer 
is critical to the performance of the CNN, but is indecipherable to a human beyond 
identifying that it is the output of a convolutional function. Thus, there is risk present for 
the human within the HAT because of an inherent inability to usefully monitor the AI.  
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Figure 16. Visual Output of the First Layer in a Convolutional Neural 
Network. Source: Krizhevsky et al. (2017, p. 89). 
2. Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence  
Trustworthiness forms the basis for trusting another party. Within human-human 
interactions, Ryan (2020) asserts that trustworthiness is a belief about the other party that 
is based upon a combination of rational, affective, and normative trust factors ascribed to 
the other party (Ryan, 2020, pp. 2752–2753). Trustworthiness from rational traits 
characterizes trust as a decision based upon a logical determination of the ability of the 
trustee to perform the necessary task: a quarterback rationally trusts the offensive line to 
block because that quarterback knows that the linemen have practiced those skills and have 
the physical ability to block the defensive players (Ryan, 2020, p. 2752). Trustworthiness 
from affective traits characterizes trust as a feeling based upon the trustor’s belief that the 
trustee is motivated upon goodwill towards the trustor: a quarterback affectively trusts the 
offensive line because the quarterback believes that the linemen are motivated to want to 
keep the quarterback to unhurt and unhurried (Ryan, 2020, p. 2752). Trustworthiness from 
normative traits characterizes trust as an expectation by the trustor that the trustee will do 
what they should do because that behavior is expected of them and to not do so would be 
considered a betrayal: a quarterback normatively trusts the offensive line to block against 
the defense because the linemen are on the quarterback’s team and to not block for the 
quarterback would be a betrayal of the quarterback, the team as a whole, and the role of 
the offensive lineman (Ryan, 2020, p. 2753). These forms of trust can be seen in Table 3. 
Viewed through this construct, trustworthiness is a relational foundation consisting of a 
complex mix of trust factors. 
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Key to this research is Ryan’s argument that AIs are inherently untrustworthy 
because trustworthiness within HAT can only fulfill the requirements for only a single trust 
factor, rational trust (Ryan, 2020, p. 2750). True affective and normative trustworthiness 
require the trustee to hold a relational motivation for why they will do what the trustor 
believes that they will do (Ryan, 2020, p. 2753). As stated in Chapter III, narrow AI is a 
highly specialized computer system which is capable of exceptional performance on 
specific, computational or logical tasks. Nevertheless, an AI fundamentally remains an 
inanimate machine that possesses no individuality or personal identity. “Decisions made 
by the AI do not matter to it,” because it is only doing what it has been programmed to do 
(Ryan, 2020, p. 2762). It is a matter of rational trust to know that the AI possesses the 
capability to perform the correct tasks. The lack of intentionality in the existence of the AI 
prevent it from possessing traits of benevolence, loyalty, or value congruence which are 
central features in human-human trust (J. Lee & See, 2004, p. 66). Thus, the correct basis 
for the trustworthiness of an AI is on its ability to reliably and adequately perform 
only its properly assigned tasks in such a manner that the user is able to accurately 
monitor its performance. Despite this, it is likely that the affective and normative forms 
of trust will still be present in the user (J. Lee & See, 2004, p. 76). The relationship of these 
different forms of trust to justified and unjustified trust will be assessed in the following 
section.  
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D. TRUST FACTORS AS HEURISTIC OR TARGET ATTRIBUTES 
1. Extension of Kahneman and Frederick’s General Definition for 
Heuristic to Trust Factors 
The notion of a correct basis for trustworthiness, or warranted trustworthiness, 
implies that there is also an incorrect basis, or unwarranted trustworthiness. Jacovi et al. 
assert that justified trust is the matching calibration of the trust level of the user to the 
warranted trustworthiness of the system (Jacovi et al., 2021, p. 627). Unjustified trust is 
the presence of trust in a system that does not have the capability of completing its assigned 
task (Jacovi et al., 2021, p. 627). The trustworthiness of a system is evaluated on an 
individual task level and is predicated by the AI’s ability to fulfill the requirements of that 
task, which can be seen by the user through the outputs of the verification and validation 
of the AI during training or through direct personal experience working alongside the AI 
(Jacovi et al., 2021, p. 628). Conversely, users can have mistrust of a system and this can 
also be justified or unjustified (Jacovi et al., 2021, p. 626). Mistrust is an equally important 
consideration because it often leads to misuse or disuse (J. Lee & See, 2004, p. 55). This 
concept of warranted trust is also seen in the National Security Commission on Artificial 
Intelligence’s (NSCAI) Final Report, which dedicates a full chapter to the idea of 
developing justified confidence in the development and use of AI (National Security 
Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021, p. 131). The NSCAI derives this term from 
an internationally recognized definition for assurance, which is the “grounds for justified 
confidence that a claim has been or will be achieved” (International Organization for 
Standardization et al., 2019, p. 2). Ultimately, a responsible user should ascertain that their 
trust or mistrust of a system is warranted. 
The use of non-rational trust factors in HAT can be described by the general 
definition of heuristics presented in Chapter II. The key to the use of heuristics in intuitive 
decision making is the subconscious substitution of a heuristic attribute in place of the 
legitimate target attribute (Kahneman, 2003, p. 707). This concept can be extended to 
human trust in AI; when assessing the trustworthiness of the AI, the user can 
subconsciously substitute affective and normative trust in place of rational trust when the 
user lacks knowledge of the AI’s performance. The user’s lack of knowledge can be caused 
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by a lack of transparency regarding the AI’s processes, a lack of experience with using that 
AI, or a combination of both. This substitution process is seen in Figure 17. The specific 
traits and characteristics that influence rational, affective, or normative trust are called trust 
factors. Rational trust factors are directly linked to the development of warranted 
trustworthiness that is the basis for justified trust. This is contrasted with affective and 
normative trust factors, which will produce unjustified trust unless the AI is sufficiently 
transparent for the user to obtain performance-related knowledge and monitor the AI’s 
performance. This does not invalidate the benefit of affective or normative traits being 
present within the AI, because their presence can amplify the trustworthiness of an AI in 
concert with the rational trust factors. It is when rational trust factors are not visible to the 
user that the presence of affective or normative trust factors can exert an influence on the 
user that is disconnected from the task performance of the AI. Thus, affective and 
normative trust factors should be considered heuristic substitutes for the rational trust 
factors, which are the target attributes. The remainder of the section will introduce AI trust 
factors that are identified in two systemic literature reviews, which will then be categorized 
as either a target or heuristic trust factor based upon Ryan’s three types of trust in the 
following section. 
 
Figure 17. Heuristic Substitution of Affective and Normative Trust Factors 
for Rational Trust Factors. 
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Hoff and Bashir (2015) provide a foundational approach to trust in automation that 
identifies three areas in which variabilities of trust factors occur. The three broad categories 
of trust factors identified are: (a) dispositional trust factors, which are characteristics of the 
user’s personhood that forms tendencies about automation; (b) situational trust factors, 
which are characteristics of the environment around the user and automation; and (c) 
learned trust factors, which are characteristics of the automation that the user has 
previously experienced. (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 413). These categories and their 
interrelation with trust are illustrated in Figure 18. Dispositional trust factors include 
culture, age, gender, and user personality traits (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 413). Situational 
trust factors are further split into external and internal variabilities; external variabilities 
include the type of system, the system complexity, the task difficulty, the workload, 
perceived risks, perceived benefits, the organizational setting, and the task framing, while 
the internal variabilities include user self-confidence, subject-matter expertise, mood, and 
attentional capacity (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 415). Learned trust factors begin with the 
initial trust level formed by preexisting knowledge which includes attitudes and 
expectations for the system, the reputation of the system, previous experience with the 
system or similar technology, and the user’s understanding of the system (Hoff & Bashir, 
2015, p. 421). Learned trust factors are then supplemented by dynamic trust factors that 
are learned during use including system performance based upon the reliability, validity, 
predictability, dependability, usefulness, and error factors as well as specific user-interface 
design features including the appearance, ease-of-use, communication style, the 
transparency or feedback, and the level of user control (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 421).  
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Figure 18. The Interrelation of Dispositional, Situational, and Dynamic Trust 
for a System. Source: Hoff & Bashir (2015, p. 427). 
A systemic literature review of human trust in AI by Glikson and Woolley provides 
a collection of common trust factors used to increase trust in AI. The list is divided into 
two categories, cognitive and emotional trust factors, utilizing definitions from Lewis and 
Weigert (1985) for these categories. Cognitive trust is the decision to trust based upon 
information available to the trustor about the trustee that is deemed to be “good reasons” 
for evidence of the trustee’s trustworthiness (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 970). It should be 
noted from Chapter II that decisions made by humans often utilize heuristic substitution, 
meaning that a reason may not be rational, even though it may be considered to be 
reasonable. Glikson and Woolley use the following cognitive trust factors based on this 
definition: tangibility, the physical presence and ability to be touched; transparency, the 
ability for the user to understand the AI’s decisions and actions; reliability, the basis for 
the user’s ability to predict the AI’s decisions and actions; task characteristics, the 
indicators that the AI is performing the correct task; and immediacy behaviors, the 
proactive actions like active listening and responsiveness that make the AI more of a 
presence for the user (Glikson & Woolley, 2020, pp. 13–14). Lewis and Weigert define 
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emotional based trust as the affective bond among the involved parties that is developed to 
the level that a failure of the trust results in a feeling of betrayal in the trustee (Lewis & 
Weigert, 1985, p. 971). Based upon that definition for emotional trust, Glikson and 
Woolley use the following emotional trust factors: tangibility, anthropomorphism, and 
immediacy behaviors (Glikson & Woolley, 2020, p. 12). Tangibility and immediacy 
behaviors are also considered to be emotional trust factors because of the affective 
responses that they can produce in users (Glikson & Woolley, 2020, p. 39). Glikson & 
Woolley broadly categorize anthropomorphism as design features and user behaviors that 
project human-like traits onto the appearance and behaviors of AIs (Glikson & Woolley, 
2020, pp. 40–42).   
Considering that Ryan asserts that two of the three forms of trust are inappropriate 
for human-AI trust, the trust factors identified by Hoff and Bashir and by Glikson and 
Woolley should be categorized as contributing to rational, affective, or normative trust. 
This delineation will allow for specific trust factors to be emphasized so that the user’s 
trust level for the AI is unjustified, a desirable state when attempting to degrade the 
performance of an adversary’s HAT. 
2. Determination of Target or Heuristic Trust Factors 
In accordance with the basis for trustworthiness in AI identified in the previous 
section, the target trust factors must be derived from or contribute to one of the following: 
AI transparency, AI task assignment, or AI performance. These three factors are the rational 
trust factors because the user must be able to gain data and information (transparency) what 
the AI is doing (task assignment) and how well it is doing it (performance). The trust factors 
which are not directly linked to the above should be considered as affective or normative 
trust factors. The separation between rational and the combination of affective and 
normative is the primary effort: it is of secondary importance within this research to 
differentiate between affective and normative trust factors because they can contribute to 
both justified and unjustified trust.  
AI transparency is the gateway for the user to gain data and information leading to 
knowledge about the AI’s tasking and performance. It is the clear communication to the 
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user of the AI’s overall and current task assignments or performance metrics; without this, 
any trust from the user is unjustified because the user has no information to base their trust 
upon. This transparency can take the form of clearly communicated performance metrics 
and task assignments given to the user by the AI developers or the form of feedback from 
the AI that permits the user to monitor its processes and outputs. Both Glikson & Woolley 
and Hoff & Bashir directly identify transparency as a trust factor. Hoff & Bashir make a 
distinction about when the system is transparent, considering the understanding of the 
system to be a component of the initial-learned trust (i.e., knowledge about metrics and 
task assignments) and the feedback or transparency of the system to be a component of 
dynamic-learned trust (i.e., the ability to monitor and understand the processes and outputs) 
(Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 420). They also identify the system complexity as a situational 
variable; the more complex the AI, the more difficult it is for the user to be able to interpret 
what the AI is doing, which decreases the usefulness of the transparency (Martinez et al., 
2019, p. 52). As seen in Chapter III, neural networks are highly complex constructs that 
can produce exceptional performance yet do so in a manner than is nearly opaque to the 
user and even the designer. A potential remedy for this is explainable AI, which is a 
developmental effort that seeks to design AIs that can maintain those high levels of 
performance and simultaneously communicate to the user how and why the AI is 
performing its tasks and producing its outputs (Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency, 2016, p. 7). 
AI task assignment is the output of the proper task mapping conducted during the 
design of the HAT. It is a rational trust factor because of the narrow nature of AI. AIs are 
designed and trained for a specific task or range of tasks with little potential to transfer that 
training onto a task for which it was not specifically trained (Martinez et al., 2019, p. 53). 
Glikson & Woolley call this task characteristics, which are the actions and decisions which 
the system is assigned to perform (Glikson & Woolley, 2020, p. 14). Hoff & Bashir identify 
several trust factors across situational and learned trust that contribute to the user’s 
understanding of the AI’s task assignments. Within situational trust, the general type of the 
system indicates to the user what its designed purpose is, which can be aided by the user’s 
level of subject-matter expertise on the tasks and the overall workload assigned to the HAT 
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(Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 416). Within areas of initial-learned trust, the user’s understanding 
of the AI and previous experiences with similar systems affects trust because the user has 
either been told or experienced the AI’s task suitability (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, pp. 420–
421). These three trust factors all contribute to the user’s level of trust in the AI before 
usage because they describe what the AI is trained to do and what the AI is assigned to do. 
If training and assignment align, then the user has a basis for justified trust; if they do not, 
then the user has a basis for justified mistrust. Dynamic-learned trust factors are also 
incorporated into the system task assignment as the user views the validity, the “degree to 
which an automated system performs the intended task,” and experiences and attempts to 
mitigate system errors (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 424). This performance feedback 
specifically regards whether or not the pre-usage comparison of trained and assigned tasks 
are actually aligned as anticipated.  
System performance is the collective measurements of outputs as defined within the 
designer’s metrics. These are rational trust factors because the AI must be able to 
accomplish its tasks in proper synchronicity with the user for the HAT to achieve its team 
mission. Within Glikson & Woolley, performance is most characterized by the idea of 
reliability (Glikson & Woolley, 2020, p. 14). Hoff & Bashir underscore the criticality of 
performance based trust factors by declaring that “trust depends on results” (Hoff & Bashir, 
2015, p. 424). Those results include the reliability, predictability, dependability, and 
usefulness to the user (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, pp. 424–426).  
Separate of these rational trust factors are affective and normative trust factors that 
can produce trust in the AI. Anthropomorphism is the most broad and crucial because its use 
of human-like features can prime the user to perceive the AI less like a machine and more 
like a person which increases trust development (Schaefer et al., 2016, p. 383). As a machine, 
the AI is incapable of truly filling the requirements to uphold affective or normative trust 
because it can neither possess good will towards the user nor can it choose whether or not it 
will perform its tasks (Ryan, 2020, pp. 2752–2753). Anthropomorphizing an AI is also 
important to consider because the dissonance between the presence of human-like features 
on an otherwise non-human machine can cause a user to feel uncomfortable or unsettled 
when in proximity to the AI (Glikson & Woolley, 2020, p. 38). This affective effect can 
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potentially cause the user to unjustifiably mistrust an AI solely because of its uncanny and 
eerie presence. Closely associated to anthropomorphizing designs and behaviors are 
immediacy behaviors, which are meant to engender a feeling of social closeness to the AI 
through the use of complementary interactions with the user and proactivity that anticipates 
the needs of the user (Glikson & Woolley, 2020, p. 14). Hoff & Bashir refer to this as 
dynamic-learned trust from the system’s appearance and communication style (Hoff & 
Bashir, 2015, pp. 422–423). Collectively, this behavior has affective and normative effects 
on the user, which are avenues of trust development (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, pp. 422–423). 
Mimicry of social interaction and attentiveness adds to the n anthropomorphism, further 
increasing the humanness of the AI. Beyond trust factors directly associated with the AI, 
Hoff and Bashir also note that the external situational factor of the organization that the HAT 
is resident within will affect the trust for the AI (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 417). This is 
especially critical, because some organizations may require the AIs usage, regardless of the 
user’s trust (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 419). In the context of targeting an adversary’s HAT, it 
must be targeted at the personnel who are permitted to choose to use or not use. 
These categorizations are neither meant to be exhaustive nor inflexible. They are 
indicative of the variety of trust factors present within the HAT construct and their presence 
will vary depending upon the specifics of the HAT and the broader situation around it (Hoff 
& Bashir, 2015, pp. 418–419). What will not vary is the need for rational trust factors to form 
the basis for warranted trustworthiness. It is important to recall from Chapter II that humans 
do not fit the rational actor model and therefore it is unrealistic to expect users to be able to 
only base their trust upon the rational trust factors, especially when specific design decisions 
are made to incorporate affective or normative trust factors like anthropomorphism into the 
AI. Thus, it is critical to understand the user’s perception of the AI because that is how the 
user will assess its trustworthiness to determine if the AI should be trusted. The following 
section will conceptually explore how to leverage the user’s perception of the AI’s 
trustworthiness in order to decrease the overall effectiveness of the HAT. 
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E. USER PERCEPTION AND MILITARY DECEPTION AGAINST HUMAN 
AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS 
Military Deception is a component of Operations in the Information Environment 
that is meant to “deliberately mislead adversary decision makers” (Office of the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. 141). It can either be ambiguity increasing, meant to 
create doubt about an event or capability, or ambiguity decreasing, meant to create 
confidence about an event or capability (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2017, p. I–9). The operation is meant to generate a difference between the actual situation 
and the intended target’s perception of the situation. Employed effectively, the ruse can 
generate surprise against adversary, a key means of gaining combat power relative to the 
adversary (U.S. Marine Corps, 2018, p. 2.22). This separation between the point of view 
of the adversary and the actual truth of the situation provides an application for the idea of 
a competent or compromised AI and the justified or unjustified trust in AI based upon the 
user’s perception of the AI as trustworthy or untrustworthy. Figure 19 illustrates the 
intersection of these relationships. Because deception is meant to mislead an adversary, the 
desired cases for the adversary must be either unjustified trust or mistrust. This focus on 
misleading an adversary’s trust is in direct conflict with the adversary’s AI designers, who 
must strive to ensure that all adversary users only possess justified trust or mistrust.  
 
Figure 19. Mapping of the User’s Perception of the Status of the AI onto the 
AI’s Actual Status. 
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1. Unjustified Trust 
The goal of a deception operation focused on increasing unjustified trust in the 
compromised AI is to convince the adversary that their current military capability is 
sufficient and secure. Effectively executed, the adversary will continue to make plans that 
utilize the full capability of the HAT because the adversary trusts that the AI will be able 
to accomplish its mission. The adversary will then be surprised when the AI is unable to 
accomplish its mission, and the clever deception planner will attempt to synchronize this 
surprise with other friendly actions so that the adversary must now simultaneously contend 
with both an unexpected failure and the friendly action. 
The two primary considerations for unjustified trust are the specific details of the 
compromised status of the AI and the unintended potential consequences of a successful 
deception. As discussed in Chapter III, AIs can be compromised due to errors in design, 
poor performance, as well as due to deliberate attacks and each of these forms of 
compromise could produce a different failure condition. Deception planners must 
understand how the AI will fail to determine which trust factors should be targeted by a 
deception operation to generate unjustified trust. Understanding the failure conditions 
associated with the compromise will also permit the deception planner to selectively utilize 
rational trust factors to increase the user’s trust. If the attackers in the “BadNet” 
compromise example discussed in Chapter III were confidently able to control the release 
of specific trigger inputs, they could have used messaging to emphasize the legitimate 
performance that the AI showed during verification and validation, heightening the user’s 
trust in that AI. In this instance, control of the release of the triggering inputs is a critical 
requirement for the attacker, because accidental release to the compromised AI would 
begin to produce the flawed outputs which would indicate to the user that the AI is 
compromised. Because deception relies on the user’s unjustified trust of a compromised 
system, the deception planner must not introduce information that is incongruent with the 
deception narrative Doing so would increase the likelihood that the deception is discovered 
by the adversary (Whaley, 1982, p. 189). The unintended potential consequences of a 
successful deception are particularly important for unjustified trust because they may cause 
the adversary to commit an action that neither they nor friendly forces desire. An example 
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of this would be the case of an AI being used to identify objects in satellite imagery to be 
attacked, similar to the deliberate image perturbation attack seen in Chapter III (Graves, 
2020, p. 51). Because the deception effort would have the adversary continue to trust their 
AI even though friendly forces have rendered it compromised, the adversary would likely 
continue to employ it as designed until the compromise is discovered. This could have 
disastrous effects if the flawed outputs of the AI result in the adversary conducting a 
weapons strike that produced civilian casualties or other collateral damage; such real-world 
consequences could trigger a demand for retaliation that ultimately escalates the conflict 
above the desired level. It must also be considered that the adversary will always attempt 
to ensure they are using a competent and uncompromised system. Thus, the adversary may 
be able to detect the issues related to the competency and correct it. In this event, the 
friendly efforts that were based on an adversary’s compromised AI are now being carried 
out on an uncompromised system. Instead of degrading the adversary’s HAT, friendly 
efforts are strengthening it which may give that adversary an advantage.  
2. Unjustified Mistrust 
The goal of a deception operation focused on increasing unjustified mistrust in the 
compromised AI is to convince the adversary that their current military capability is 
insufficient or insecure. Effectively executed, the adversary will continue to expend time 
and resources attempting to determine the specific nature of the compromise. The 
adversary may also delay or avoid operational use until the AI is perceived as trustworthy. 
This may also prompt the adversary to pursue alternative methods to accomplish the 
mission that would be assigned to the HAT; if the alternative means reassigning the tasks 
to humans instead of the AI, the outputs will likely be slower or less accurate because of 
the performance difference between a human and an AI.  
The two primary considerations for unjustified mistrust are the means of countering 
justified trust through adversarial use and the longevity of the deception. Hoff & Bashir’s 
assertion that results are highly influential to trust levels means that friendly efforts to 
deceive the adversary must be able to counter the consistent reinforcement of justified trust 
produced by regular exposure to the AI’s competency (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 424). 
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Consider again the example of the AI being used to identify objects in satellite imagery, 
except in this instance friendly forces are unable to compromise the AI. To create doubt in 
the adversary’s mind regarding the AI’s competency and trustworthiness, deception 
planners could utilize physical decoys with coordinated messaging to amplify the alleged 
misclassification. The decoy would be designed to match the signature of a legitimate 
military system or unit but would be able to be rapidly hidden following its imaging by the 
adversary’s satellite. When the adversary AI categorizes the decoys as the matching system 
or unit, messaging efforts could then describe the actual location of the matching system 
or unit (e.g., an aircraft decoy is imaged on a runway in country X, the decoy is hidden, 
and the messaging describes and confirms the actual aircraft is being refueled in country Y 
which is sufficiently far to prevent the aircraft from flying between countries X and Y). 
Performed multiple times with synchronized messaging, the adversary would likely begin 
to doubt the AI’s performance and potentially begin an investigative effort to determine 
how the AI is compromised. Another serious consideration is the length of time associated 
with the deception effect. This is especially critical if the deception is considered to be a 
necessary condition to enable an operation against the adversary; it is likely that the 
adversary’s behavior will react to the operation, so the deception planner must consider 
how to continue reinforcing the unjustified mistrust of the AI throughout the entire 
timeline. The deception operations surrounding the amphibious assault at Normandy 
during World War II is a good example of this; the deception plan mislead the Nazis to 
believe that the main effort of the amphibious assault would land at Pas de Calais and that 
any other amphibious assault was a feint (Breuer, 1993, p. 117). The deception needed to 
last long enough to prevent the Nazis from committing their armored reserves against the 
Normandy beachhead while the Allies lacked the combat power ashore to defeat that force. 
Had the deception succeeded in surprising the Nazis about the amphibious assault location 
been discovered to be a deception in the week following D-Day, it is likely that the Nazis 
would have been able to destroy the Allied forces ashore (Breuer, 1993, pp. 220–221). 
Similarly, the length of the deceptive effect in unjustified mistrust must be possible for as 
long as friendly forces predominantly depend upon the mistrust of the AI to maintain 
combat power. If the deception planners believe that the deception effort will be discovered 
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by the adversary before the friendly forces are able to gain an advantage, mitigating 
measures should be implemented to ensure that those friendly forces are not left exposed.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Complementary Human-AI Teams will likely be the most advantageous 
employment of AI because they intentionally assign tasks to the team-member best suited 
to accomplish them. To do this, AIs will need to be able to demonstrate their warranted 
trustworthiness to the user so that the user will actually use and rely upon the performance 
benefits provided by the AI. The user’s trust is a critical link that can be influenced for both 
the good or the bad of the HAT’s performance. Military deception planners should closely 
consider how to ensure that the adversary user always holds unjustified trust or mistrust for 
the AI so that their HAT’s performance is degraded. Doing so will generate a competitive 





A. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The most significant limitation for this research is the lack of experimentation to 
test the assertion that trust in AI can be influenced independently of the AI’s 
trustworthiness through heuristic substitutions. Hypothesis testing is a fundamental step in 
the scientific process and is critical in evaluating the arguments presented in this thesis.  
Another critical consideration in research is to ensure that the study population is 
representative of the targeted population. Within this research, very few of the cited studies 
specifically utilized military personnel as the study participants. The concept of heuristic 
substitution was specifically chosen because of its nearly universal usage in intuitive 
decision making, so it is unlikely to discover that heuristic substitution does not apply at 
all to the military population. It does however allow for the possibility of another unknown 
and unconsidered factor to also make a significant contribution to the user’s trust in AI.  
Closely related to the representativeness of the study populations for the targeted 
military population are the limitations associated with cultural differences between the 
study and target population. Culture is the amalgamation of the societal inputs on 
individuals and groups and will have a profound impact on outlooks. Hoff and Bashir 
recognize this by identifying the dispositional trust present in the user well before the first 
use of the system. (Hoff & Bashir, 2015, p. 413). Because this research is focused on 
influencing a foreign adversary’s military personnel, the unique culture of that foreign 
military must be considered and adequately represented in the study population. A specific 
culture was not chosen for this research in order to develop a broader method for 
influencing trust without solely assuming a specific cultures tendencies. Thus, in order for 
this research to be operationalized, the target audience’s culture must be identified and 
captured within any study participants. 
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
To test the hypothesis of this research, there is a need for a study framework that 
assesses the influencing of trust development involving military personnel within HAT. 
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This framework will assist in reducing some of the limitations present within this research, 
namely confirmation or disconfirmation of the hypothesis and the lack of studies using 
military personnel as study participants. Because the ultimate goal of this research is to 
reduce the effectiveness of an adversary’s HAT, the testing of the methods described 
should utilize a consistent approach that attempts to approximate the likely human target 
as closely as possible. The study should specify a single rational trust factor and single 
affective or normative trust factor to treat as deliberately variable. The study should also 
assess the level of trust over the full length of the interaction to determine how direct 
experience affects the user’s trust. 
Chapter III introduced the consideration of AI as either being competent or 
compromised for the purposes of matching its status with the desired trust level of the user. 
The examples cited in Chapter III, Section F, all utilized either full knowledge of the algorithm 
or conducted their attack against an otherwise undefended system. It is naïve to assume that an 
adversary will leave an AI system unguarded at any point and will likely attempt to protect the 
datasets, algorithms, and other system design considerations. Thus, it will be necessary to 
develop a framework for intelligence collection that aids planners in guiding intelligence 
collection efforts towards critical information about the adversary’s HAT. 
Another area for future research is how to best protect HATs employed by the USA 
against a similar form of deception described within this research. This presents two areas 
for investigation: protecting the human and protecting the AI. Ultimately it is the user’s 
perception that matters in regard to trust, but the AI should receive significant focus to 
determine what is the best combination of the trust factors to ensure that the trustworthiness 
of the AI is always accessible to the user. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The impact of AI on the military as an instrument of national power should not be 
understated (National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021, p. 9). 
Complementary teaming of humans and AIs will deliberately harness the advantages of 
each and likely offset the inherent disadvantages each brings to the team. This strength will 
generate combat power through its speed and will threaten a force that has either no HAT 
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or a less optimized one. In either case, it should be the objective of friendly forces to 
degrade the performance of the HAT to gain a combat power advantage relative to the 
adversary. This research has defined a method on how to do so based upon two preliminary 
observations. 
The first is that intuitive decision making uses a subconscious heuristic substitution 
in place of the actual decision that can often result in systemic errors (Kahneman, 2003, p. 
707). It is the prevalence of heuristic substitutions that pass the System 2 reasonableness 
check on the output of System 1 that makes this such a critical component of the research. 
This is the basis for the extension to substitution of affective and normative trust factors in 
place of or in equal consideration to rational trust factors. 
The second observation is the contrast between a competent AI and a compromised 
AI. Chapter III provided a cursory knowledge level of the functioning and performance of 
AIs to show that a well-designed AI is a marvel of modern computing technology. It should 
also be apparent from Chapter III that an AI can be compromised as easily as it is designed. 
The example of MS Tay is an illuminating example of a vulnerability within an otherwise 
exquisite system being identified and exploited culminating in an undesired and 
unpredicted state of affairs. The juxtaposition of competence and compromise is the basis 
for determining whether and AI is trustworthy or not. 
The combination of these two observations provides the key assertion of this 
research: the overall effectiveness of the HAT can be degraded by influencing the 
user’s trust for the AI through heuristic trust factors in order to produce unjustified 
trust or mistrust. This separation of the user’s perception of the AI from its actual status 
drives a wedge between the two, disrupting the integrated nature of the HAT. Separating 
the user’s trust from the AI’s trustworthiness results in the degradation of the HAT’s 
critical capability to generate combat power through speed of action, resulting in the gain 
of a combat power advantage for friendly forces. 
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